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Corporate liability and the criminalisation of failure   
Liz Campbell, Durham University*1 
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Abstract 
Defining and prosecuting corporate criminality has long been fraught with difficulty. As a 
result, the UK legislature is turning to an indirect form of omissions liability, by criminalising 
failure to prevent certain crimes like bribery and the facilitation of tax evasion. This article 
charts the development of indirect omissions corporate liability in the UK, and examines its 
rationales and benefits. Existing commentary has not explicated the implications of 
extension to other offences; I consider possible objections, regarding due process rights; 
reliance on omissions liability; effectiveness; and the use of the measures to date. Though 
its likely impact is less than clear, I conclude that, on balance, corporate liability for failure 
to prevent crime is justifiable and warrants being extended to economic offences and 
beyond.     
 
A. Introduction  
Under common law, the imposition of criminal liability on corporate entities 2 has long been 
fraught with difficulty. Corporate offending, like crimes involving individuals, runs the gamut 
                                                 
*Professor of criminal law, Durham University.  
1 My thanks to Andrew Mohamdee for research assistance, and to Cliff Campbell, Nick Lord, Arlie Loughnan, 
Radha Ivory, Tanya Mitchell, Jonathan Bonnitcha, Justin O’Brien, and the participants at seminars at the 
University of Sydney and the University of Queensland for their comments. Any errors are my own. 
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from small-scale offences against property through to bribery, tax evasion, manslaughter, 
and human rights abuses. However, as distinct from the situation regarding natural persons, 
corporations range from single person firms, through to small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) and to vast multinational corporations (MNCs) with complex management 
structures, operation and production processes, supply chains, and systems. These 
organisational structures create unique opportunities3 for unlawful behaviour to occur and 
to be concealed, and day-to-day business activities may entail considerable risk or potential 
harm.4 This is often compounded by the size, location and sophistication of the entity. 
The development of corporate criminal liability5 from the 19th century onwards 
sought to address the commission of crimes by corporate entities through their 
anthropomorphising, with the management as the mind and the workers as the hands. 
Since then, despite having ‘neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned’,6 
throughout the UK corporate entities may be found criminally liable, both for and through 
the acts and states of mind of their employees.7 Though there is no procedural obstacle to 
prosecution, the means by which criminal responsibility can be ascribed and conviction 
attained are not straightforward nor realised often in practice. In essence, corporate entities 
are unlikely to be prosecuted for suspected criminal behaviour, and if so, unlikely to be 
convicted. The growing complexity and multi-jurisdictional nature of modern corporations 
and the current legal framework contribute to this , in addition to an ideological aversion to 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 This term is employed broadly, to denote corporations, banks, public l imited companies, l imited companies 
and partnerships.  
3 Of course, not all  opportunities are exploited, and opportunities do not equate to criminality.  
4 P. Bucy, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?’ (2009) 46 American Criminal Law Review 
1437.  
5 I use this term to denote corporate crimina l l iability, corporate criminal responsibility, and entity criminal 
l iability. 
6 Baron Thurlow, as cited in J.C. Coffee, ‘“No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment’ (1981) 79(3) Michigan Law Review 386.   
7 The UK comprises three jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.  
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contested cases.8 So the reasons for this paucity of prosecutions and convictions are not just 
pragmatic and practical, but also ideological and normative. 
To remedy concerns about the ability of the existing legal scheme to address 
problematic corporate behaviour adequately, the UK legislature is turning to an indirect 
form of omissions liability: the Bribery Act 2010 introduced the corporate offence of failure 
to prevent bribery, and this provision has now been emulated in respect of the failure to 
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion, domestic and otherwise, in the Criminal Finances Act 
2017. This article analyses the extension of this approach to a wider range of offences.  
In this article I chart the development of indirect omissions liability for corporate 
entities in the UK, and examine its rationales and benefits. Existing commentary has not 
explicated possible objections to its extension. I consider the implications of extending this 
to other offences and focus on: due process rights; reliance on omissions liability; 
effectiveness; and the use of the measures to date. In articulating and addressing a number 
of conceivable counterarguments, I seek to bring further normative clarity to the debate 
and to provide detailed analysis which is crucial in whether to justify (or to oppose) a wider 
scheme of indirect corporate criminal liability. Though its effect is unclear, I conclude that 
such corporate liability is justifiable and warrants being extended.  
 
B. The problems with direct corporate criminal liability in the UK 
Issues with the extant scheme of liability in the UK have prompted consideration of less 
conventional ways of pursuing corporate criminality. In general, the current framework can 
                                                 
8 N. Lord, ‘Responding to transnational corporate bribery using international frameworks for enforcement: 
Anti-bribery and corruption in the UK and Germany’ (2014) 14 Criminology and Criminal Justice 100; N. Lord, 
‘Detecting and investigating transnational corporate bribery in centralised and decentralised enforcement 
systems: discretion and (de-)prioritisation in the UK and Germany’ (2014) 25 Policing and Society 579. 
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appear fragmented and complex, with co-existing models: as Celia Wells remarks, ‘There 
has been no blueprint or underpinning design’.9 Depending on the particular substantive 
offence, corporate criminal liability may be vicarious, attributed through the doctrine of 
identification, or stem from management failure, and the rules governing it may be 
statutory or derive from common law.  
The two overarching models of corporate criminal liability in the common law world 
can be described as derivative/nominalist on the one hand, and realist/organisational on the 
other. The former perspective regards the corporation as a collection of individuals ; thus, 
criminal responsibility derives from that of human actors. As is outlined below, this 
encompasses the concept of vicarious liability and the attribution of liability through the 
identification doctrine. By comparison, the realist or organisational interpretation views the 
corporate entity as more than the sum of its parts, and so as capable of acting aside from 
and beyond its constituents. This is evident in Australia’s ‘corporate culture’ provision under 
which the creation of a certain culture is relevant in determining whether that entity has 
committed a fault offense,10 and in liability for omissions. These different approaches are 
outlined briefly, as their perceived flaws are driving the move towards indirect omissions 
liability. 
A company is vicariously liable for an employee’s criminal acts committed with the 
scope of the latter’s employment.11 Granted, vicarious liability is of relatively limited 
                                                 
9 C. Wells, ‘Corporate Responsibil ity and Compliance Programs in the United Kingdom’ in S.  Manacorda, G. 
Forti and F. Centonze (eds) Preventing Corporate Corruption: The anti bribery compliance model (Dordrecht: 
Springer 2014) 505-513, 506.  
10 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) §12.3(2); see J. Clough and C. Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 138; O. Dixon, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: The Influence of Corporate Culture’ 
in J. O’Brien and G. Gill igan (eds), Integrity, Risk and Accountability in Capital Markets: Regulating Culture 
(London: Hart 2013) 251-268. Though, it is important to note, this provision has never been applied (see 
Dixon).  
11 R v British Steel [1995] ICR 586. 
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application in English criminal law (in contrast to the situation in the US12), and is imposed 
under statute generally.13 Crucially, and depending on the crime, vicarious liability may 
entail proof of fault on the part of the employee before it is ascribed to the corporate entity, 
thereby limiting liability in some respects. Nonetheless, it may also draw liability widely in 
linking corporate responsibility to the acts of all employees. Indeed, this is the reason for 
the perception that the US has considerable success in terms of pursing corporate crime 
when compared with the UK.14 
Co-existing with this for offences requiring proof of mens rea is the principle of 
identification, whereby those persons who control or manage the affairs of a company are 
deemed to embody the company itself. This principle permits criminal liability to be 
imposed on a corporation for an offence that requires proof of mens rea. As Denning LJ 
noted in the civil context, the ‘state of mind’ of ‘directors and managers who represent the 
directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does ’ is ‘the state of mind of the 
company and is treated by the law as such’.15 The leading authority is Tesco Supermarkets 
Ltd v Nattrass,16 though regrettably, there was some divergence between the Law Lords as 
to the principle’s precise content.17 This lack of clarity compounds practical problems of 
prosecution. Subsequently, the strictness of the directing mind test was tempered 
                                                 
12 New York Central & Hudson Railroad Co. v United States 212 U.S. 481 (1909); P. Bucy, ‘Corporate Ethos: A 
Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability’ (1991) 75 Minnesota Law Review 1095; J. Arlen and W. 
Carney ‘Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence’ (1992)  University of Illinois 
Law Review 691. 
13 Mousell Bros Ltd v London and North-Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836, 845, Atkin J. 
14 See TRAC report, ‘U.S. Prosecution of Corporate Crime Varies Widely by Location, Program and Agency’ 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/411/ (last visited 18 December 2017). Though, of course, most alleged 
corporate crime is addressed civilly and does not involve judicial adjudication; rather it is settled in advance 
with l ittle judicial oversight. For how this works i n practice, see the University of Virginia database: 
http://library.law.virginia.edu/corporate-prosecutions/  (last visited 26 February 2017). 
15 H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159, Denning LJ. 
16 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153. 
17 ibid Lord Reid 170-1, Viscount Dilhorne 187, and Lord Diplock 199-200. 
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somewhat by the Privy Council in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities 
Commission,18 holding that attribution of liability for an individual’s actions to a corporate 
entity was a matter of construction on a case-by-case basis, thereby extending the range of 
persons who could be identified with the company.19 This development was considered in 
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999), and the identification doctrine reaffirmed.20  
The enduring and crucial issue lies in the difficulty in determining who is the 
directing mind, and then ascertaining whether s/he controls what the entity does. The irony 
is that this doctrine serves to insulate larger and more sophisticated companies  from 
criminal investigation and prosecution, notwithstanding the greater power and capacity for 
harm given their (deliberately) myriad layers of management. In contrast, the smaller the 
company, the easier it is to determine who is the controlling mind and thereby ascribe 
criminal liability. As a result, the identification doctrine has been described as  ‘highly 
unsatisfactory’21 and ‘inadequate … unfair … [and] unhelpful’.22 Furthermore, it cannot 
encompass agents and service providers (e.g. auditors, consultants, and contract 
manufacturers), who play ever more important and influential roles in contemporary 
corporate structures and practices.  
                                                 
18 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 NZLR 7. 
19 See J. Payne, ‘Corporate Attribution and the Lessons of Meridian’ in P. Davies and J. Pila (eds), The 
Jurisprudence of Lord Hoffmann: A Festschrift for Leonard H Hoffmann  (Oxford: Hart 2015). 
20 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796. 
21 B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1993) 47.  
22 A. Milford, SFO General Counsel, ‘Control Liability – Is it a good idea and does it work in practice?’ 
Cambridge Symposium on Economic Crime 2016, Jesus College, Cambridge, 6 September 2016: 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/09/06/control -l iability-good-idea-work-practice/ (last visited 18 December 
2017). 
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For these reasons, the identification doctrine was viewed as deficient and 
problematic for corporate manslaughter in particular23 and was replaced (though some 
would say less than adequately24) by the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act 2007.25 Corporate criminal liability here is predicated on the failure to adhere to a duty 
of care, resulting in a gross breach causing death.  
Despite their differences, these modes of ascribing liability may be classified as 
direct, in that a corporate entity may be charged with and found to be criminally liable for a 
substantive offence through one of these routes. In addition to this, liability may be indirect, 
by which I mean for failing to prevent or report an offence, as opposed to liability for the 
offence itself.26  
 
C. Failing to prevent: indirect corporate criminal liability  
Currently there are two offences in the UK that entail corporate criminal liability for failure 
to prevent certain forms of crime, namely bribery and the facilitation of tax evasion. As is 
explored below, it is likely that soon these will be replicated more widely, though for other 
economic crimes only.  
Nicholas  Lord and Rose Broad characterise this as a ‘transition’ in corporate 
                                                 
23 See Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter (1996) Law Com No 237 Part IV; Home Office, Corporate 
Manslaughter: The Government’s Draft Bill for Reform (March 2005) Cm 6497, 8-9. 
24 See D. Ormerod and R. Taylor, ‘Legislative Comment: The Corporate Mansl aughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act 2007’ [2008] Crim LR 589; C. Wells, ‘Corporate criminal l iability: a ten year review’ [2014] Crim LR 877, 854; 
S. Field and L. Jones, ‘Five years on: the impact of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007: plus ça change?’ [2013] International Company and Commercial Law Review 239. 
25 Section 1 of the Act, which applies across all of tehUK, provides that an organisation is guilty of corporate 
manslaughter if the way in which its activities are managed or organised causes a person’s death, and amounts 
to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased. The way senior 
management organises or manages its activities must be a substantial element in the breach.  
26 This is also referred to as ‘preventive fault’: R. Gruner, ‘Preventive Fault and Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Transforming Corporate Organizations into Private Policing Entities’ in H. Pontell  and G. Geis (eds) 
International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime (Dordrecht: Springer 2007) 279-306. 
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liability;27 whether the trend is as embedded as they claim, certainly it is gaining traction. 
This is not a radical break from convention: as Jonathan Clough reminds us, the earliest 
corporate prosecutions were for omissions causing a nuisance,28 and failure to act is a well-
established basis of liability in the area of workplace safety.29 Moreover, as outlined, the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 provides that corporate criminal 
liability for manslaughter derives from a failure to adhere to a duty of care, resulting in a 
gross breach causing death. Be that as it may, in all of these instances the corporate entity’s 
liability derives from a duty of care or its duty to maintain a safe working environment, 
whereas the recent failure to prevent offences involve a wider understanding of corporate 
duties, in assigning criminal liability for the behaviour of non-employees, who may not be 
acting to further the company’s interests . So, while these health and safety and 
manslaughter examples are cognate, they are conceptually distinct. What is happening in 
respect of corporate liability in the UK is more expansive and engages corporate entities in a 
preventive way in contexts that hitherto were beyond their reach and responsibility. A 
critical question is why this approach fell into abeyance and why it is now being re-
energised, in a normative change that both state and the judicial system are addressing in a 
somewhat ad hoc way. That aside, it is to the two existing offences that I now turn. 
 
a. Failure to prevent bribery  
                                                 
27 N. Lord and R. Broad, ‘Corporate Failures to Prevent Serious and Organised Crimes: Foregrounding the 
‘Organisational’ Component’ (2017) European Review of Organised Crime 27-52. 
28 J. Clough, ‘Bridging the Theoretical Gap: The Search for a Realist Model of Corporate Criminal Liability’ 
(2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 267-300, 270, citing Langforth Bridge (1635) Cro Car 365 and R v Birmingham & 
Cloucester Railway Co [1842] 3 QB 223. 
29 J. Clough, ‘Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human Rights Abuses’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 899-931, 919; see Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, s 3.  
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Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 made it an offence for a commercial organisation to fail to 
prevent bribery. This was a novel measure in the UK, and comprised part of a broader suite 
of reforms to the law of bribery, following various law reform proposals30 and a series of 
negative reports from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.31 
Though a key driver of legal change was international, this form of liability has acquired a 
significant domestic character and momentum of its own. And as is explored below, there is 
a clear connection between the passage of the 2010 Act and the deployment of deferred 
prosecution agreements, the latter introduced primarily because their capacity to settle 
lowers the evidential bar. 
Under section 7 a relevant commercial organisation32 (‘C’) is guilty of the offence of 
failure to prevent bribery if a person (‘A’) associated with C bribes another person intending 
to obtain or retain business for C, or to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of 
business for C. An ‘associated’ person is defined in section 8 as an individual or an 
incorporated or unincorporated body who ‘performs services’ for or on behalf of the 
organisation, and whether someone is performing services is to be determined by reference 
to all the relevant circumstances. This was framed in an intentionally broad way.33  
                                                 
30 Law Commission Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (LC248, 1998); Law Commission, Reforming 
Bribery (Law Com CP 185, 2007); Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (LC313, 2008).   
31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Kingdom Review of Implementation of 
the Convention and 1997 Recommendation Phase I Bis Report; United Kingdom: Phase 2 Report on the 
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions and The 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions; 
Phase 2bis Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International 
Business Transactions (2008).  
32 Section 7(5) states that a ‘relevant commercial organisation’ is a body which is incorporated under the law 
of any part of the UK and which carries on a business (including a trade or profession) there or elsewhere; any 
other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business in any part of the UK; a partnership 
which is formed under the law of any part of the UK and which carries on a business there or elsewhere, or any 
other partnership (wherever formed) which carries on a business in a ny part of the UK. 
33 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010 Guidance about procedures which relevant commercial 
organisations can put into place to prevent persons associated with them from bribing: 
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There are a number of elements of note here. In the first instance, the Act has 
extraterritorial reach: A and/or the other person may be located outside the UK.34 Also, 
intention to generate some benefit in the course of business is required – this element will 
be returned to in relation to the equivalent taxation offence in the Criminal Finances Act 
2017. Moreover, A would need to satisfy the criteria of a bribery offence under the Act, 
whether or not A has been prosecuted for such an offence:35 that is, this is not predicated 
on conviction. 
Crucially, section 7(2) provides a defence for the entity to prove that it had in place 
adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with it from bribing.36 As 
required by section 9, the Secretary of State published guidance about these procedures, 
which includes case study examples and outlines six principles: proportionate procedures; 
top-level commitment; risk assessment; due diligence; communication (including training); 
and monitoring and review.37 Though highly significant, the parameters of the Guidance 
have not been examined in court.  
So, a commercial organisation commits a section 7 offence when it fails to prevent a 
bribery offence by an employee or an agent and cannot show it had in place adequate 
procedures to prevent the bribery. There is no fault element for the organisation in this 
respect, contrary to the Law Commission recommendation which turned on a culpable 
                                                                                                                                                       
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf [37] (last visited 18 
December 2017). 
34 s 7(3)(b). 
35 s 7(3). 
36 cf the use of compliance in sentencing in the US: B. Garrett, ‘Structural Reform Prosecution’ (2007) 93 
Virginia Law Review 853, 958. 
37 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010 Guidance (n 33). For instance, the International Organization for 
Standardization is positioning its certification ISO 37001 on anti -bribery management systems as a means by 
which an entity could contend that it had adequate procedures in place: see 
https://www.iso.org/standard/65034.html  (last visited 18 December 2017). 
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failure to prevent bribery.38 The Commission had recommended the creation of an offence 
‘of negligently failing to prevent bribery committed by a person performing services on 
behalf of the organisation’,39 which is narrower than that enacted in the end. The 
Commission counselled against a strict liability ‘failure to prevent bribery’ offence on the 
basis that it ‘would run entirely counter to the normal approach to serious offences’. 
Accordingly, the recommended offence required proof of negligence in failing to prevent 
bribery on the part of an individual connected with the organisation, whose functions 
included the prevention of the commission of bribery by persons performing services for 
it.40 The Parliamentary Joint Committee rejected this ‘narrow and complex solution’ because 
of its focus on whether a ‘responsible person’ was negligent, rather than on the collective 
failure of the organisation to ensure that adequate anti-bribery procedures were in place.41 
The Government accepted the Committee’s recommendation to remove this element of 
negligence. The only element of fault in section 7 relates to the individual commission of the 
substantive/predicate offence, not the failure to prevent it. Needless to say, this broadening 
of criminal liability is seen as a positive dimension of this offence, as a means of 
supplementing intentionality.42 
The expressed purpose of section 7 is ‘to influence behaviour and encourage bribery 
prevention as part of corporate good governance.’43 Moreover, the rationale for the 
                                                 
38 Law Commission Reforming Bribery (Law Com No 313, 2008) [6.19]. 
39 ibid [6.1].  
40 ibid [6.101]. 
41 Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bil l , First Report Draft Bribery Bill 16 July 2009 [89], available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtbribe/115/11508.htm (last visited 18 December 
2017). 
42 For further elaboration see I.B. Lee, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team Member Responsibility’ 
(2011) 31 OJLS 755, 761.  
43 Ministry of Justice and Department for Business, Innovation & Skil ls, Insight into awareness and impact of 
the Bribery Act 2010 Among small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (2015) 3: 
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‘adequate procedures’ defence is ‘to encourage companies to realistically assess the bribery 
risks they face and put in place proportionate procedures to mitigate them .… [and] to 
promote the establishment of a bribery prevention dynamic.’44 This encapsulates a view of 
the criminal law in this instance as a preventative device and a mechanism to influence 
behaviour, rather than something that operates primarily in reactive mode.45  
At the time of writing, four corporations have been charged with section 7 failures to 
prevent bribery: Standard Bank; Sweett Group; XYZ (an anonymised small-to-medium 
enterprise); and Rolls-Royce PLC.46 All of these have been initiated by the Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO), though the Crown Prosecution Service can prosecute such cases also.47 No 
other charge was indicted against Standard Bank and Sweett Group; XYZ was the subject of 
an indictment alleging conspiracy to corrupt, conspiracy to bribe, and failure to prevent 
bribery; and the Rolls-Royce PLC indictment alleged offences of conspiracy to corrupt, false 
accounting, and failure to prevent bribery. Critically, none of these cases was contested at 
trial: Sweett Group pleaded guilty to the section 7 charge, and the remaining cases involved 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs).  
                                                                                                                                                       
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/440661/insight-into-
awareness-and-impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010.pdf (last visited 18 December 2017). 
44 ibid. 
45 See J. Hil l , ‘Corporate criminal l iability in Australia: an evolving corporate governance technique?’ [2003] 
Journal of Business Law 1. Despite this potential capacity to influence corporate behaviour, empirical data 
shows that in fact this has not occurred, though whether by accident, incompetence or design is unclear: see 
G. Gill igan et al, ‘Penalties Regimes to Counter Corporate and Financial Wrongdoing in Australia: Views of 
Governance Professionals’ (2017) 11 Law and Financial Markets Review 4; also J. O’Brien, ‘Editorial: Just when 
will  a corporation be prosecuted to a judicial conclusion?’ (2017) 11 Law and Financial Markets Review 1-3. 
46 See Standard Bank DPA: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/sfo-v-standard-
bank_Final_1.pdf; XYZ DPA: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/08/sfo-secures-second-dpa/;  
SG guilty plea: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/sweett-group and Rolls-Royce PLC DPA: 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/rolls -royce-plc/ (last visited 18 December 2017). 
47 The SFO is a specialist prosecuting authority that pursues cases of serious or complex fraud, bribery and 
corruption in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Notably it both investigates and prosecutes cases. See N. 
Garoupa, A. Ogus and A. Sanders ‘The investigation and prosecution of regulatory offences: is there an 
economic case for integration?’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 236. The Director of Public Prosecutions or 
the Director of the Serious Fraud Office must give personal consent to a prosecution under the Bribery Act 
2010 (s 10), and to a prosecution for failure to prevent facil itation of foreign tax evasion offences under 
section 46 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (s 49).  
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DPAs have a close and special connection to indirect omissions liability. In England 
and Wales48 a DPA is an agreement reached between the prosecutor and a corporate 
entity49 that could be prosecuted for an economic crime,50 but criminal proceedings are 
suspended automatically if the Crown Court approves the agreement. The DPA entails 
suspension of the prosecution for a certain timeframe, as long as the corporate entity meets 
certain specified conditions, such as paying a financial penalty or compensation and co-
operating with future prosecutions of individuals suspected of involvement in criminality. 
The judge must be convinced that the DPA is ‘in the interests of justice’ and that its terms 
are ‘fair, reasonable and proportionate’.51 Leveson P noted in relation to the first English 
DPA that “the more serious the offence, the more likely it is that prosecution will be 
required in the public interest and the less likely it is that a DPA will be in the interest of 
justice.”52 Regardless, this does not appear to be a bar to the settling of DPAs: despite the 
gravity and extent of the systematic criminality in relation to Rolls Royce, for instance, 
Leveson P found the DPA to be justified on the grounds that significant chances had been 
made to management, policies, practices and culture; that there was allegedly full co-
operation and willingness to expose potential criminal acts; and the adverse consequences 
                                                 
48 The DPA scheme does not apply in Northern Ireland or Scotland, though in the latter there is a  
self-reporting initiative for bribery offences with a view to consideration of civil settlement:  
see 
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Guidelines_and_Policy/Guidance
%20on%20the%20approach%20of%20COPFS%20to%20reporting%20by%20businesses%20of%20bribery%20of
fences%20JUNE%202017.pdf  
49 This is a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association, but not an individual: Crime and 
Courts Act 2013, sch 17.  
50 Courts Act 2013, sch 17, pt 2. This includes theft, fraud, forgery, money laundering, bribery, and fraudulent 
evasion of VAT. 
51 Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 45 and ch 17; cf the US scheme: see R. Epstein, ‘Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of Unconstitutional Conditions’ in A. Barkow and R. Barkow (eds) 
Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct (New York: New York 
University Press 2011) 38; B. Garrett Too Big to Jail; How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press 2014); J. Rakoff, ‘Justice Deferred is Justice Denied’, The New York Review of Books, 
19 February 2015.  
52 SFO v Standard Bank plc [25]. 
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of prosecution.53 Moreover, the use of DPAs and the absence of a criminal trial mean that 
there has been no judicial articulation or confirmation of the terms of section 7, especially 
the meaning of adequacy: one could add that if the procedures fail to prevent bribery they 
are, by definition, inadequate! While the statements of facts in the DPAs include a narrative 
and thus indicate what failure to prevent looks like, there is no outline of the compliance 
procedures. 
 
b. Extending indirect corporate criminal liability 
Failure to prevent has found purchase since 2010, in contrast to the statutory scheme for 
corporate manslaughter which has not been mooted as a prototype for any further reform. 
In 2014 David Green, the Director of the SFO, declared that ‘a relatively simple amendment 
to Section 7 of the Bribery Act, creating the corporate offence of failing to prevent acts of 
financial crime by associated persons, has steadily gained traction amongst interested 
parties. Such a change would greatly increase the SFO’s reach over corporate entities in 
appropriate cases.’54 That same year both HM Revenue & Customs’ consultation on 
‘Tackling offshore tax evasion’ and HM Government’s Anti-Corruption Plan emphasised the 
value and significance of section 7.55 Action 36 of the Anti-Corruption Plan outlined that the 
Ministry of Justice would examine the case for a new offence of a corporate failure to 
prevent economic crime, as well as examining corporate criminal liability more widely. This 
proposal was taken forward by an interdepartmental group, but momentum faltered with 
                                                 
53 SFO v Rolls-Royce plc & anor [33]-[64]. See further discussion below at pp 32-33. 
54 SFO Speech, Pinsent Masons Regulatory Conference 2014: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2014/10/23/david-
green-cb-qc-speech-pinsent-masons-regulatory-conference/ (last visited 18 December 2017). 
55 HM Government, Anti-Corruption Plan (2014) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388894/UKantiCorruptionPl
an.pdf (last visited 18 December 2017). 
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the collapse of the coalition government in May 2015.56 Nonetheless, the leak of documents 
a few months earlier by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists which 
implicated HSBC in tax evasion and avoidance ensured that corporate facilitation of tax 
offences maintained a high media and political profile.57 These revelations and associated 
rhetoric have not been matched by steady policy and legislative action. As Celia Wells noted 
wryly, the UK Government’s enthusiasm in this context has waxed and waned, in keeping 
with whether or not there is an impending international anti-corruption summit with 
associated news coverage.58 
In December 2015, HM Revenue & Customs published the summary of responses to 
its consultation on offshore tax evasion, setting out that the UK government would legislate 
for, inter alia,59 a new criminal offence for corporations that fail to take adequate steps to 
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion, in addition to tougher financial penalties for offshore 
evaders and enablers. So, while the proposed general offence had faded from view, the 
HSBC scandal and the revelations in the Panama Papers in April 2016 kept some attention 
on tax evasion and the desirability of indirect liability. These events were matched by 
                                                 
56 C. Wells ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime – a proposal’ [2017] Crim LR 426, 427. 
57 The Guardian, ‘The HSBC fi les: what we know so far’, 11 February 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/11/the-hsbc-fi les-what-we-know-so-far (last visited 18 
December 2017). HSBC has its headquarters in London; its Swiss banking arm was revealed to have assisted 
customers in avoiding taxes and concealing millions of dollars of assets by providing untraceable cash and 
advising clients how to circumvent domestic tax authorities. It’s worth recalling that the HSBC story dates back 
to conduct in 2007-8 after which HSBC substantively overhauled its procedures globally as a consequence of 
the resulting DPA in the US and associated publicity. In such c ircumstances its changes would fall into the 
reasoning adopted for the Rolls Royce DPA, as outlined above: see J. O’Brien ‘HSBC: Will  the sword of 
Damocles fall?’ (2015) 9 Law and Financial Markets Review 63-73. 
58 Wells, ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime’ (n 56) 427.  
59 HM Revenue & Customs, Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to 
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion, Summary of Responses, December 2015: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170131155414/https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/
tackling-offshore-evasion (last visited 18 December 2017). 
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numerous political commitments at the Anti-Corruption Summit in London, May 2016.60 
Consequently, the Criminal Finances Bill was introduced in October 2016, after which the 
Ministry of Justice issued a call for evidence on corporate liability for economic crime, which 
closed March 2017.61  
All that said, what has now been legislated for relates to the evasion of tax only. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that this is a shifting legal landscape, with further change likely. 
 
c. Failure to prevent tax evasion 
The Criminal Finances Act 2017 was enacted in April 2017, as the wider consultation was on-
going. Part 3 of the Act, which came into effect on 30 September 2017, creates two new 
corporate offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion: one of failure to prevent 
facilitation of UK tax evasion and the other of foreign tax evasion. These broad offences, 
designed to target tax-planning consultants who enable criminal evasion and crossing of the 
contested line between avoidance and evasion,62 are punishable by an unlimited fine.63  
Section 45 relates to the failure to prevent facilitation of UK tax evasion offences. A 
‘relevant body’ (‘B’) (which means bodies corporate and partnerships, not individual 
persons64) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a UK tax evasion facilitation offence 
when acting in the capacity of a person associated with B. ‘Associated person’ is defined 
widely and includes any individual or corporate who performs services for or on behalf of 
                                                 
60 see https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016/about (last 
visited 18 December 2017). 
61 see https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/corporate-liability-for-economic-
crime/supporting_documents/corporateliabilityforeconomiccrimeconsultationdocument.pdf  (last visited 18 
December 2017). 
62 P. Alldridge, Taxation and Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017) ch 3. 
63 s 45(8). 
64 s 44(2). 
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B.65 In any event the facilitation must have been carried out in the capacity of the 
association with B. Jurisdictionally, the relevant body and the associated person can be 
either in the UK or overseas, as long as UK taxes are evaded. Notably, the associated person 
need not evade tax but must facilitate this; the statute distinguishes between a ‘UK tax 
evasion offence’ and a ‘UK tax evasion facilitation offence’.66 This makes more remote the 
nexus between the corporate entity and the substantive offence. The Act does not require 
the associated person to have been convicted of the offence. 
Section 46 covers the failure to prevent facilitation of foreign tax evasion offences, 
differing from section 45 in the location of the offences facilitated. In terms of territoriality B 
must be a body incorporated, or a partnership formed, under the law of any part of the 
United Kingdom, or it must carry on business or undertaking in the UK; alternatively, any 
conduct constituting part of the foreign tax evasion facilitation offence must take place in 
the UK. The foreign offence is subject to a ‘dual criminality’ test in that both the evasion and 
the facilitation must be criminal in the overseas jurisdiction but also in the UK had the 
conduct occurred there.67  
Crucially, both section 45 and 46 are ‘strict liability’ offences: neither the relevant 
body nor its senior management need to have participated in, known about, or even 
suspected the facilitation or the evasion for the relevant body to be criminally liable. 
Reminiscent of the Bribery Act 2010, it is a defence for the body to prove that, when the UK 
tax evasion facilitation offence was committed, it had in place such prevention procedures 
                                                 
65 s 44(4). 
66 See ss 45(4) and 45(5) respectively. 
67 ss 46(5) and (6). 
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as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect it to do so, or it was not reasonable in 
all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.68   
Also akin to the Bribery Act 2010, section 47 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 
requires the Chancellor of the Exchequer to prepare and publish guidance about procedures 
that bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated 
person from committing tax evasion facilitation offences. The Guidance69 centres on the 
same six Principles as those promulgated regarding bribery.70 
The Bribery Act 2010 has had a clear influence on the tax evasion offences, albeit 
that the wording of the defence differs. Whereas the bribery defence refers to adequacy, 
the defence for tax evasion centres on reasonableness, and it remains unclear how we 
differentiate between these. Though one could question why the defences were not 
standardised, it seems to be the case that lobbying from financial institutions provided the 
driver to adopt reasonableness, as apparently a less onerous standard.71 As discussed in 
analogous fashion above, what constitutes ‘reasonable procedures’ and how this is 
evidenced remain ambiguous. Notably, there is some slippage in the Guidance, which states 
‘that merely applying old procedures tailored to a different type of risk (or clients -focused 
procedures) will not necessarily be an adequate response to tackle the risk of tax evasion 
                                                 
68 s 45(2). 
69 HM Government, Government guidance for the corporate offences of failure to prevent the criminal 
facilitation of tax evasion, 1 September 2017: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642714/Tackling-tax-
evasion-corporate-offences.pdf (last visited 18 December 2017); also see The Facil itation of Tax Evasion 
Offences (Guidance About Prevention) Regulations 2017. 
70 Namely: risk assessment; proportionality of risk-based prevention procedures; top level commitment; due 
dil igence; communication (including training); and monitoring and review. Regarding the meanings of due 
diligence see J. Bonnitcha and R. McCorquodale ‘The Concept of “Due Diligence” in the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 899.  
71 SFO presentation, Cambridge Symposium on Economic Crime, Jesus College, Cambridge, 6 September 2017.  
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facilitation’ [my emphasis].72  
In addition, there is no need for benefit to be intended or to accrue in respect of the 
taxation offence, in contrast to the bribery offence. Requiring proof of benefit or intention 
of this would ensure a nexus between the associated person’s actions and the corporation, 
and would exclude those acting against the wishes or aims of it. Nonetheless, omitting this 
requirement increases corporate accountability by incentivising the introduction of robust 
compliance and preventive policies. It is understandable why Parliament did not include a 
requirement of benefit; instead the associated person must be providing services for or on 
behalf of the corporation.  
 
d. Further extension of the scheme   
Since enactment there have been proposals to emulate section 7 of the Bribery Act in 
respect of a range of economic offences. Celia Wells suggests that extending the 
organisational failure to prevent mode of liability to other economic crimes makes sense on 
the basis that the DPA and sentencing regimes already group these crimes together;73 that 
financial and economic crimes are often international in scope and warrant such a reaction, 
and that harmonisation via international bodies like the OECD, the UN and the EU is under 
way already.74 Beyond this context, the Joint Select Committee on Human Rights has 
recommended the introduction of an offence of failure to prevent human rights abuses ,75 
                                                 
72 HM Government, Government guidance for the corporate offences of failure to prevent the criminal 
facilitation of tax evasion 27. 
73 See n 50. 
74 Wells, ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime’ (n 56). 
75 Joint Select Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights and Business 2017: Promoting responsibility and 
ensuring accountability https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/443/44309.htm [191]-
[193] (last visited 18 December 2017).  
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though this has not gained equivalent political attention. A comparable suggestion has been 
made in relation to institutional child sexual abuse in Australia.76  
Indirect omissions liability has many potential benefits. Instrumentally, it is likely to 
be more effective than orthodox criminal prosecution for substantive offences. Ascribing 
criminal liability to corporate entities in this way is more straightforward and therefore 
preferable to the identification doctrine and to the gross negligence route as in the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. It is far less restrictive than the 
identification doctrine in its ability to penetrate the breadth of corporate entities and in its 
conception of the corporation as a multi-dimensional organisation.77 Yet it is not as 
‘indiscriminate as pure vicarious liability’ in allowing the organisation to show that it has 
addressed the risks of its employees and agents engaging in criminal activity on its behalf 
through the adequate procedures defence.78 Moreover, indirect omissions liability and the 
associated defences aim to ensure that corporate management fosters a culture of 
compliance and communicates commitment to the prevention of bribery and tax evasion 
throughout the organisation. The extraterritorial dimension is also significant, as it would 
otherwise be difficult to criminalise and pursue behaviour overseas.   
The expressive component of wider corporate liability is significant also, in its 
communication to the public and to the business community. Imposing criminal liability for 
failure to prevent certain crimes conveys a positive and important message about the 
expectations and responsibilities of corporate entities.79 As is explored below, however, the 
                                                 
76 P. Crofts ‘Criminalising institutional failures to prevent, identify or react to child sexual abuse’ (2017) 6 
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy  104‐122. 
77 Wells, ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime’ (n 56) 439. 
78 ibid. 
79 See P. Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 
144. 
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potential symbolism of criminalisation may be muted somewhat by prosecution practice. 
These benefits aside, there has been no academic analysis of possible objections to or 
queries about this approach. This article now addresses that gap. 
 
D. Critiquing indirect corporate criminal liability 
The enduring difficulties in prosecuting and convicting corporate entities means that any 
developments which enable or ease this will be received positively by the State and many 
commentators, if not by corporate actors. I do not disagree per se with the supportive 
arguments for indirect omissions offences outlined above: rather I want to explore some 
possible objections which have been neglected in the debate so far, centring on normative, 
rights-based, and empirical matters. A prerequisite to any further entrenchment is more 
detailed engagement with counterarguments. Next, I consider the implications for due 
process rights; opposition to omissions liability more broadly; effectiveness; and the way in 
which existing provisions has been used to date.  
 
a. Due process rights  
Failure to prevent offences may encroach on the due process rights of the corporate entity 
as well as individuals implicated in the problematic behaviour. The consequences of criminal 
conviction, for natural and legal persons, are great. While corporations cannot be jailed and 
there is no attached individual liability in this context, a conviction for failure to prevent 
crime will result in a fine and could damage personal and business reputations.80 With this 
                                                 
80 That said, a section 7 conviction does not result in mandatory debarment from EU procurement contracts as 
occurs for other corruption and bribery offences. Regulation 57 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 
(which give effect to Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement) provides that direct bribery offences under ss 1, 2 or 6 of the Bribery Act 2010, inter 
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in mind, the rationale for due process rights is to offset, to some degree, the imbalance of 
power that exists between the state and the accused, and to ensure that negative outcomes 
are borne only by those found guilty to the requisite high standard. Of course, the economic 
and societal power of many modern MNCs is comparable that of the state,81 and there is no 
possibility of imprisonment. Nonetheless, and though often overlooked, corporate entities 
enjoy many rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), including due 
process rights.82    
Proof of fault is not necessary in respect of the corporate entity’s failure, and instead 
there is an onus to demonstrate reasonable or adequate compliance measures  in what Celia 
Wells calls a ‘reverse burden defence’.83 One rights-based objection to this is that it 
encroaches on the presumption of innocence as protected by Article 6(2) of the ECHR. 
Ostensibly this seems problematic, but in certain circumstances Parliament may allocate 
legitimately a legal burden84 to the accused in criminal trials. This is via ‘reverse onus 
clauses’, which require him ‘to prove some matter the effect of which is that he is not guilty 
                                                                                                                                                       
alia, trigger mandatory debarment from all  EU public sector contracts for up to five years. Although section 7 is 
not included, a contracting authority stil l may exclude an entity from participation in a procurement procedure 
if it can demonstrate that it is ‘guilty of grave professional misconduct, which renders its integrity 
questionable’ (regulation 57(8)). See A. Webster ‘Could a company be debarred following a conviction for 
failure to prevent bribery?’ [2016] Crim LR 485. 
81 R. Grantham, ‘The legitimacy of the company as a source of (private) power’ 239 -263 in K. Barker, S. 
Degeling, K. Fairweather and R. Grantham (eds), Private law and power (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2016). 
82 M. Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies, Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2006). P.H. Van Kempen, ‘The Recognition of Legal Persons in International Human Rights 
Instruments: Protection Against and Through Criminal Justice?’, in M. Pieth & R. Ivory (eds), Corporate Criminal 
Liability. Emergence, Convergence, and Risk (Dordrecht: Springer 2011) 355-389. For a critique of what is 
viewed as the appropriation of human rights discourse to serve the interests of global capital see A. Grear 
Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2010). 
83 Wells, ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime’ (n 56) 435. See also J. Stanton-Ife ‘Strict Liability: 
Stigma and Regret’ (2007) 27 OJLS 151. 
84 A probative or legal burden requires the party who bears it to prove the matter at issue or else lose on that 
point, whereas the evidential burden requires sufficient evidence to be adduced to raise an issue at trial 
(Jayasena [1970] AC 618, 622-23). 
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of the offence charged’, such as the absence of one of the elements of the actus reus of the 
offence, or the existence of a defence.85  
The courts have resolved challenges to reverse onus clauses in a number of ways, in 
some instances ‘reading down’ provisions that otherwise would be incompatible with Article 
6(2) so that they impose an evidential burden instead.86 Beyond this, the Court of Appeal has 
upheld the imposition of a legal burden of proof in particular contexts and for important public 
ends. In R v Davies, the Court held that a legal burden of proof in the form of a defence of 
reasonable practicability in section 40 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 for 
offences consisting of a failure to comply with a duty or requirement to do something ‘so far 
as is practicable, or so far as reasonably practicable, or to use the best practicable means to 
do something’ was justified, necessary and proportionate, and was not incompatible with 
Article 6(2).87 This was founded on the regulatory nature and purpose of the Act; the choice 
of the duty holder to operate in a regulated sphere of activity with the concomitant 
acceptance of the activity’s regulatory controls; the initial requirement on the prosecution 
to prove that the defendant owed the relevant duty and that the relevant safety standard 
had been breached; the defendant’s knowledge of the facts relied on in support of the 
defence; and that the consequences of conviction did not involve the ‘moral obloquy’ of a 
truly criminal offence nor imprisonment.88 A comparable conclusion was reached in relation 
to a defence to a drink driving charge under the Road Traffic Act 1988.89 The Court 
emphasised that the ECHR did not outlaw presumptions of fact or law but required that they 
                                                 
85 I. Dennis, ‘Reverse onuses and the presumption of innocence: in search of principle’ [2005] Crim LR 901, 901. 
86 R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545. 
87 [2002] EWCA Crim 2949. 
88 [24]-[31]. 
89 Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264. See A. Ashworth, ‘Case Comment: Sheldrake v DPP [2004] UKHL 43’ [2005] 
Crim LR 215, 219. 
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should be kept within reasonable limits and should not be arbitrary. The reverse onus 
provision was upheld on the basis that it was directed to a legitimate objective; that the 
defence gave the defendant an opportunity to exonerate himself; that it was more 
appropriate for him than the prosecution to prove the likelihood of his driving as it was a 
matter closely conditioned by his own knowledge and state of mind at the material time; 
and that the imposition of the burden did not extend past what was necessary and 
reasonable and was not arbitrary.  
All of this indicates that the use of reverse onus defences here does not compromise 
Article 6. These defences are directed at a legitimate objective, namely the prosecution and 
prevention of serious criminality; they allow corporate defendants to exonerate themselves 
through articulation of compliance procedures; it is more appropriate for the entity than the 
prosecution to prove the details of internal procedures and implementation in practice; and 
the imposition of the burden is necessary, reasonable and not arbitrary. Moreover, and 
crucially, the reverse onus defences do not require proof of lack of guilt; what must be 
established only is the presence and use of adequate/reasonable procedures.  
Despite doctrinal approbation, normative questions might remain about the impact 
on the presumption of innocence, when conceived of broadly.90 Critiques of reverse onus 
provisions usually centre on the implications for autonomy of the individual,91 and are 
informed by the potential imprisonment that follows conviction. Regardless of one’s 
misgivings or otherwise as to reverse onuses in the individual sense, a convincing case can 
                                                 
90 L. Campbell, ‘Criminal Labels, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Presumption of Innocence’ 
(2013) 76(4) MLR 681. 
91 J. Horder, ‘Bureaucratic “Criminal” Law: Too Much of a Bad Thing?’ in A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall, M. 
Renzo and V. Tadros (eds) Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2014) 124; R. Shiner ‘Corporations and the Presumption of Innocenc e’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 485, 487.  
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be made that the situation regarding corporate defendants is separate and distinct. Unlike 
individuals, corporations have no autonomy right not to be treated as means, and cannot be 
imprisoned. I agree that reverse onus offences properly allocate the burden of proof for 
corporations and do not violate the presumption: the available defence meets any 
normative demands for ‘legal innocence’,92 and the power dynamic leads to the conclusion 
that reverse onuses are just.93   
This is a pragmatic acceptance of a possible encroachment on the presumption of 
innocence, justified by the purpose and benefits of indirect omissions liability and the 
nature of corporate entities and the business environment. Section 7 prompted companies 
to reconsider the character of and responses to bribery risks: this compliance incentive 
would be removed if the defence onus were to be altered.94 Moreover, reverse onuses ease 
the burden on the prosecution significantly, both in terms of matters to be proven as well as 
costs.95 While there is no need for a conviction for the substantive offence to prove failure 
to prevent it, part of the prosecution case is to establish to the relevant standard that the 
given offence occurred, which may be difficult. Overall, trials of this type are lengthy and 
complicated, risky and costly, not least given the political climate in which the prosecutor’s 
very existence was in the balance for some time.96 Though discussions about abolition seem 
to have abated, the SFO’s ‘value for money’ still is foregrounded in speeches.97 More 
contested and protracted trials would increase expenditure significantly. 
                                                 
92 Shiner (n 91) 493. 
93 ibid 495. 
94 Wells, ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime’ (n 56) 435. 
95 For this point regarding strict l iability see A. Simester ‘Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?’ in A. Simester (ed)  
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96 See Financial Times, ‘Tories pledge to abolish Serious Fraud Office – manifesto’, 18 May 2017. 
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The second dimension of the due process argument relates to individual rights. In 
terms of direct legal effect, there is no individual liability under the two existing provisions, 
and no suggestions that any further development would include this.98 No individual is 
charged or is on trial; therefore, Article 6 is not engaged for him. As for indirect legal effect, 
one could argue that conviction of a company for failure to prevent makes the pursuit and 
conviction of an employee, such as a compliance manager, more likely. Evidence gathered 
could be used in a subsequent individual trial, but this again would be for a separate, 
substantive offence with associated legal protections. One could envisage corporate liability 
in this context being used as leverage in respect of individual prosecutions, but this sort of 
manoeuvre would not compromise Article 6 necessarily.   
Beyond all this, one could argue that as the Companies Act 2006 permits the 
incorporation of single-member companies99 indirect omissions liability could be employed 
against a sole trader, resulting in de facto encroachment on his due process rights. Of 
course, under the Salomon doctrine the corporation is a single legal entity, distinct and 
separate from any or all the individuals who compose it.100 Nevertheless, while the use of 
failure to prevent against a sole trader is possible, it is highly unlikely in practice, and so any 
due process worries here are mitigated. 
Finally, and most critically, there may be due process implications for the individual 
on whom the omissions offence hinges (i.e. the apparent briber/bribee or facilitator). He 
will have evidence raised against him in the course of the trial , given that his misdeeds need 
                                                                                                                                                       
October 2016: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/10/06/chief-operating-officer-appointment/ (last visited 18 
December 2017). 
98 Though as Karl Laird notes, the Act is si lent as to whether it is possible for an officer of the company to 
be guilty of ss. 45 and 46 offences on the basis of secondary l iability: K. Laird, ‘The Criminal Finances Act 2017 - 
an introduction’ [2017] Crim LR 915, 938. 
99 Section 7. 
100 Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
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to be established. This is not his criminal trial and there will be no individual conviction; 
nonetheless, he has no capacity to defend himself against these assertions. Though this may 
seem unpalatable, it does not breach his right to be presumed innocent.101 He may regard 
his reputation and professional standing as having been compromised by virtue of the 
contentions in court that his behaviour constituted bribery or facilitation; that is beside the 
point as neither domestic nor ECHR jurisprudence precludes this, as he is not being tried, 
convicted or punished. Accordingly, I conclude that there are no due process objections to 
extension of the failure to prevent approach.    
 
b. Aversion to omissions liability  
The next challenge to indirect corporate criminal liability centres on a principled opposition 
to omissions liability in general. The conventional wisdom, or at least rhetoric,102 is that 
unless one is under a duty to act, be that through a relationship, acquisition of responsibility 
or contract,103 one can fail to respond to or remedy a given situation, notwithstanding how 
onerous this may be, without criminal liability. 104 All that said, the extent to which this 
understanding still holds true is questionable. Moreover, I suggest that concerns about 
omissions liability for individuals do not apply in this context. Essentially, any argument 
opposing indirect corporate criminal liability on this ground can be rebutted on two fronts: 
first, that we accept various forms of individual liability based on omissions, and second, 
that the justifications predicated on duty and opportunity are even more pertinent and 
tolerable for corporate entities. 
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There is a wariness about omissions liability for individuals, and a sentiment that this 
should be in limited and particular circumstances only. Antony Duff speaks convincingly of a 
civic responsibility and moral duty ‘to assist the law in achieving its proper purposes ’;105 this 
falls far short of criminal liability for failing to do so. The legitimacy of imposing ‘social 
responsibility’106 on individuals through the criminal law can be questioned due to the 
encroachment on autonomy. In addition, when the offence is one of failing to prevent a 
crime, another matter in relation to individuals is that they may be connected to or 
intimidated by the offending party,107 and thus further harm might result. These concerns 
about individual omissions liability do not transfer to the corporate context.  
Even for individuals, omissions liability is justifiable where a duty exists, as long as 
there is capacity and opportunity to act, and where the extent of the legal obligation is 
limited.108 In relation to corporate entities, duty accrues through voluntary participation in a 
regulated, profitable field, and the entity is placed ideally in this context; one could ask who 
or what else would have opportunity to prevent such criminality. Though this co-opting of 
legal persons could be regarded as their responsibilisation109 in a displacement of policing 
obligations,110 really it is a recognition of the imbalance of power, the opacity of business 
structures, and the impermeability to enforcement.   
Furthermore, omissions offences come in different forms, with varying levels of what 
Andrew Ashworth calls ‘intensity of criminalisation’.111 The first level comprises the offence 
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106 A. Ashworth, ‘The scope of criminal l iability for omissions’ (1989) 105 LQR 424.  
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of failure to report, then failure to prevent, next failure to protect, through to conviction for 
the substantive offence in which the actus reus is an omission.112 So the legal onus on 
corporate entities is relatively limited in that it criminalises failure to prevent an offence, as 
opposed to requiring intervention to protect a given person or interest. All of this underlines 
the acceptability of omissions liability here. 
  
c. Effectiveness    
Along with these rights-based and normative matters, which do not pose an impediment to 
indirect omissions liability, a critical issue lies in the fact that its effectiveness is unclear and 
unproven. There is no evidence that compliance programmes, as are required by these 
defences, are transformative in preventing or deterring crime, and in fact they may impact 
negatively in permitting the rationalisation of problematic behaviour. Moreover, internally 
the procedures can give a façade of compliance, and they may overlap with pre-existing 
recording obligations.  
Empirical evidence is lacking as to the value of compliance programmes in inhibiting 
criminality and improving corporate culture more widely.113 To my knowledge, there has 
been no reported causative or correlative decrease in corporate misdeeds anywhere since 
the introduction of compliance requirements whether through DPAs, sentencing provisions, 
or in defences, nor any qualitative indication from individuals in corporations that their 
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behaviour is altered/improved. In essence, complex and costly compliance procedures will 
be constructed which may be yet not affect behaviour or practice positively.  
Even if the programmes are worthwhile hypothetically, corporate entities might 
construct ‘cosmetic’ procedures so as to meet the requirements through unproductive 
‘ritualism’.114 This could be for criminal or questionable purposes, or due to the perceived 
complexity of the undertaking. While reasonable procedures are proportionate to the size 
and nature of the entity,115 bigger firms can absorb and adapt to these requirements more 
easily. Compliance will necessitate tax and legal risk assessments , the complexity of which is 
compounded by the global mobility of employees and associates and by diffuse and 
diversified corporate structures and supply chains. These factors may incentivise superficial 
compliance.  
Furthermore, Kimberly Krawiec points out that ‘differentiating real internal 
compliance structures from purely symbolic ones is a difficult task for legal decision-makers, 
particularly ex post when, by definition, the structures in question have failed to deter 
misconduct’.116 Courts and agencies lack sufficient information about effectiveness,117 
leading to difficulties in ascertaining adequacy and/or reasonableness, a pronounced issue 
given the absence of contested cases. As a result, determination relies on the SFO’s initial 
investigation and appraisal in deciding whether or not to charge, and the judicial oversight 
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provided in the conclusion of DPAs.118 The defence standards’ open-textured nature means 
there is considerable room for negotiation by corporate entities in establishing what is 
adequate and/or reasonable. Here the accused party can shape the meaning of the defence 
for the offence with which it is charged: in other words, business interests define, or at least 
influence, legality. Christine Parker would describe this as a form of ‘meta-regulation’ of 
corporate responsibility, which centres on internal governance processes in a way that 
allows entities to avoid the conflict between self-interest and social values, and therefore to 
avoid accountability.119 And as Frank Pearce and Steve Tombs note in relation to regulatory 
compliance, ‘strategies that stress consultation and conciliation typically end up with 
agencies endorsing the industry’s own evaluations of what is reasonable and usually allow 
companies to negotiate their way out of penalties for violating even these agreements’.120 
Conversely, one could argue that allowing corporate entities to inform the content and 
parameters of defences surely is the whole point, if their behaviour is to be affected 
positively. This resonates with ‘responsive’ regulatory theory, which posits that regulation is 
most effective and legitimate where it is cooperative and engenders a perception that 
regulation is in the interest of the regulated.121 The question is whether criminal law should 
be imposed on, or alternatively negotiated with, corporate entities. Fundamentally, our 
normative conclusion may depend on whether we view such actors as socially useful 
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constructs that are essentially lawful albeit with capacity for criminality like any actor, or as 
inherently criminogenic.122 One can remain neutral as to whether corporate bodies are non-
moral or amoral: even a benign view of corporate behaviour and recognition of the merits 
of dialogue cannot remedy the nebulous quality of these defences.   
In terms of judicial oversight, it is notable that all the DPA hearings and thus all the 
section 7 cases have been in the Crown Court at Southwark, before Sir Brian Leveson, 
President of the Queen’s Bench Division. On one interpretation, this ensures consistency 
and cultivates a body of expertise. Contrariwise, it is dubious for the ascertainment of 
adequacy and/or reasonableness to rest solely with one judge, not least as DPAs are not 
judicially reviewable in England and Wales. Without wishing to impugn the work or the 
integrity of Sir Brian Leveson P or the SFO, one could surmise that the close ‘relational 
distance’123 between the state and the alleged corporate criminals may have an impact on 
the form and robustness of the enforcement response.  
In addition, it is arguable that these defences may in fact encourage criminality by 
virtue of the opportunities that a compliance programme without true legitimacy presents 
to rationalise illegal behaviour.124 Senior management may acquire a false sense of security 
due to their perception that the creation of certain procedures will insulate against 
criminality. This may detract from other initiatives that might be more impactful: though 
compliance systems may translate into good compliance practices, managerial oversight, 
planning, commitment to compliance values, and organisational resources are just as 
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important.125 Ultimately, the presence of adequate or reasonable procedures serves as a 
defence, not a mechanism for change. The failure to prevent approach perpetuates the 
perception that the misconduct is an aberration, or is done by someone extrinsic to or 
working at odds with the corporate entity. Despite the fact that corporate culture might 
have influenced or enabled the misbehaviour, the formal presence of a compliance 
framework may serve to counterbalance this in a legal sense.  
It goes without saying that any effect on individual and corporate behaviour is 
predicated on knowledge of the legal provisions and their criteria, as well as a belief in the 
likelihood of detection and enforcement. A survey of more than 1,000 senior UK corporate 
decision-makers carried out in May 2017 found low levels of awareness of the failure to 
prevent tax evasion offences: 76% of respondents said that they were not aware of the new 
offences.126 Awareness will no doubt improve now that the provisions are in force; 
nonetheless this may undermine claims about the likely alteration of corporate behaviour.  
Finally, these defences may overlap in part with pre-existing recording obligations, 
such as under the 2017 Money Laundering Regulations which require ‘obliged entities’ in 
the financial sector and beyond to apply customer due diligence and other measures to 
prevent their services being used for money laundering. It is conceivable that potential 
overlap is helpful in reducing the costs and demands of compliance, not least given the 
enormous anti-money laundering (AML) compliance industry.127 That said, Peter Alldridge 
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observed that AML policies have induced ‘defensive over-reporting’128 and the cognate 
defences may ratchet up record-keeping similarly for debateable ends.  
Brandon Garrett advocates scepticism about the policy, legal, and judicial focus on 
compliance in the US, given the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating whether 
compliance programmes create effective remedies.129 I share his doubts, but suggest that a 
critical and mitigating difference is that the UK framework ‘frontloads’ compliance in its 
inclusion as a legislative defence rather than in later negotiation with the companies, and 
so may be more positively impactful. The defences provide an ex ante incentive to create 
and implement adequate/reasonable procedures, which, despite a dubious evidence base, 
should prompt at least incremental changes in corporate reflection and practice. Thus, on 
balance, debateable effectiveness is not fatal to the extension of indirect omissions liability.  
 
d. Failure to prevent in practice: from prosecution to prevention?  
The implementation of indirect omissions liability to date should give us pause before 
further expansion, given the absence of prosecutions of both legal and natural persons. As 
noted above, four corporations have been charged with section 7 failures to prevent 
bribery, resulting in one guilty plea and three DPAs.130 No section 7 case has involved a 
contested prosecution. Through its focus on compliance, with a preference for settlement 
over contention,131 the burgeoning failure to prevent scheme represents a fundamental 
reframing of the criminal law from a punitive to a preventive model. Though this might be 
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viewed as its most positive and potentially successful dimension, the objection raised here is 
that it could usurp substantive criminalisation, prosecution and punishment. Of course, the 
next question is whether this is objectionable.  
The purposes of the criminal law are both preventive and reactive, encompassing 
punitive aims as well as rehabilitative and restitutionary ones.132 In theory and practice the 
criminal law always has sought to deter as well as punish problematic behaviour. What is 
occurring in respect of corporate liability is an eschewing of the fundamental punitive 
component for preventative and remedial logics. The SFO states that ‘DPAs enable a 
corporate body to make full reparation for criminal behaviour without the collateral damage 
of a conviction’,133 and describes them as ‘a new kind of disposal of criminal risk in this 
jurisdiction, conceptually … somewhere between a guilty plea and a civil recovery’.134 These 
depictions are telling and are applicable to failure to prevent offences also, which occupy a 
comparable interim position: like so-called regulatory offences135 they are characterised by 
strict and omissions liability and reverse-onus provisions, but the acts to which they relate 
are not ‘morally neutral’.136 Furthermore, they aim to alter behaviour before trial is 
contemplated, in contrast to being predicated on enforcement through prosecution and 
conviction.137 Thus, our evaluation of indirect corporate liability could be determined by 
whether we view the core of criminal law as the prevention of harm, or as relating to 
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censuring primarily. Though failure to prevent liability gives precedence to the former, the 
provisions still retain the capacity to convey moral condemnation.  
Beyond this, I suggest we should move away from viewing the issue through the 
prism of criminal law only to look at the harm involved also. State legal measures, such as 
criminal law, are one component of a ‘smart mix’ that seeks to incentivise and ensure 
human rights protection and responses by corporate actors.138 Rather than this being a 
matter of criminal law solely, with analysis centring on its meaning, boundaries, and 
purported consistency or internal logic, our focus should extend to how best to prevent and 
address corporate misdeeds within the existing criminal law framework, with attendant 
stigma and protections. The question is how best to give effect to the legitimate 
preventative aim of improving corporate practices rather than being constrained by the 
orthodoxy of criminal law and process, constructed with individual vulnerabilities and 
concomitant protections in mind. Our legislative and scholarly efforts should relate to the 
wrongs and harms to be addressed, namely corporate failure to prevent criminality and to 
construct adequate preventive procedures, and to interpret and assess indirect omissions 
liability as part of the response to this governance gap. 
All that said, it is difficult to understand how a DPA can be justified for failure to 
prevent offences. From the point of view of the SFO, negotiating a DPA in respect of 
substantive bribery offences instead of prosecution sometimes is logical due to the 
difficulties in satisfying the requisite evidential burden, especially in some international 
cases. Moreover, the consequences that flow from bribery convictions, such as mandatory 
debarment under EU law, imply that a less punitive approach might be justifiable or 
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arguably in the public interest in some instances.139 However, unlike the direct bribery 
offences, a defence is built into the failure to prevent offences. The option of a DPA might 
be regarded as a second bite of the cherry, so to speak, in that the corporate entity can still 
negotiate away from prosecution after admitting the failure offence by virtue of not having 
adequate or reasonable procedures. This appears to be an incompatibility between DPAs 
and indirect omissions offences, or at least a duplicate means of circumventing criminal 
prosecution. Thus, despite their current interlinkage, I propose that DPAs should not be 
available in this context.  
Whether prosecution is pursued or otherwise, the criminal law entails distinctive 
consequences and expression,140 underlining why corporate criminal liability is key here as 
opposed to any civil approach.141 I argue that indirect omissions liability provides both an 
adequate criminal law response with attendant stigma as well as involving a useful 
preventive dimension, and does not necessarily dilute the force or meaning of the criminal 
law. This represents an understandable shift in emphasis, not a wholesale reformulation. 
Regardless, it should not replace substantive criminal responsibility, insofar as it seems to 
both over-criminalise and under-criminalise corporate entities.142 The aforementioned 
lower standards and the absence of a fault requirement leads to higher likelihood of success 
in terms of conviction or at least conclusion of DPAs,143 though historical and present 
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practice suggest that there is no danger of over-criminalisation or enforcement in fact.144 
Simultaneously, the potential for replacement of the substantive criminal law and direct 
liability might result in de facto under-criminalisation. This implies that the provisions are 
not sufficient alone, and should not replace the orthodox use of substantive criminal law, 
though there is no evidence of this in practice.145  
A final dimension of these concerns relates to the absence of corresponding 
prosecutorial action against individual actors. There has been no prosecution in the UK of 
any individuals for criminal behaviour related to the same series of facts  of the four section 
7 cases, though investigation continues into the conduct of individuals in Rolls Royce PLC.146 
This state of affairs is comparable to the limited number of individual prosecutions arising 
from deferred and non-prosecution agreements reached with companies in the US,147 which 
has drawn sharp criticism as being ‘technically and morally suspect’.148 Of course, there has 
been a very small number of cases in the UK, and the legal scheme is still nascent, so one 
must be wary of drawing decisive conclusions. Nonetheless, DPAs and indirect omissions 
liability for corporate entities cannot be allowed to replace the holding to account of 
individuals through the criminal law. 
 
E. Conclusion  
Paradigmatically, failure to prevent offences, as executed currently by means of DPAs, 
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denote a shift from the binary of criminal law, from guilty/not-guilty to a more gradated 
notion centring on negotiation and compliance. A comparable opposition in the regulatory 
space sees advocates of punishment pitted against the compliance school, in what Laureen 
Snider describes as a binary of criminalisation and cooperative regulation,149 though it has 
also been portrayed more constructively as a continuum.150 I suggest that there is a move in 
respect of corporate criminal liability to what might be called cooperation through 
criminalisation.151 Here the criminal law is used as leverage152 to effect change in corporate 
behaviour, though contested prosecution for failure to prevent crime is unlikely. This is 
reminiscent of the hybridisation of criminal/civil and of punishment/regulation identified in 
other contexts.153 Though often depicted negatively, there are positive dimensions and 
opportunities to this phenomenon,154 which should not be dismissed here. In contrast to 
entities being ‘[k]icked and damned in the hope of inculcating a corporate conscience’  155 
the developments outlined above indicate a more subtle preventive mode.  
Failure to prevent crime represents another piecemeal development to corporate 
criminal liability, one that is combined closely with deferred prosecution agreements. There 
is an incremental move towards its further expansion, and away from direct liability, which 
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on a sympathetic reading is understandable, as otherwise change might not occur at all. 
Indeed, James Stewart observed that legislatures and courts have not adopted corporate 
criminal liability because of its philosophical coherence within the surrounding legal system; 
instead they do so practically as there is no other meaningful option.156 Similarly, indirect 
corporate criminal liability is a reaction to intractable problems with the identification 
doctrine, and replicates systems of compliance and due diligence in the AML and financial 
worlds generally. That aside, there remains the inescapable problem of wider state 
ambivalence towards the regulation of capitalism and financial markets, and the 
encountering of a competing normative position regarding the need to address corporate 
crime robustly.157 The political climate in the UK is such that deeper intervention and change 
in respect of corporate misconduct are neither feasible nor likely.158 
Having considered four counterarguments to indirect corporate criminal liability, I 
advocate extension to other offences, but would remove the possibility of negotiating DPAs 
in conjunction with this. Moreover, it is hard to discern a rationale for addressing bribery 
and tax evasion only, and, beyond this, why any extension should be limited to economic 
crimes.159 Rather than protecting certain interests above others, the transformative 
potential of omissions liability could be realised through its extension to non-financial 
crimes such as labour exploitation in foreign jurisdictions, and human rights abuses. 
Humanitarian issues and the harms caused are most pertinent in relation to corporate 
wrongdoing, and thus further expansion is warranted. That said, only a minority of 
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corporate offenders ever is intercepted,160 as criminality and harm may be diffuse or 
hidden, and the victims unknown, unaware, or unlikely to report. Regardless of its ultimate 
reach, indirect omissions liability is far from a panacea but nonetheless represents a useful 
tool in addressing corporate wrongdoing.  
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